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THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. DAN TARLOCK*
I. INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTALISM OPENS THE
DOOR FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
This Essay explores the role of Non-Governmental Organizations
[NGOs] in the establishment and enforcement of global environmental
priorities. It examines the deficiencies in classic international law that
NGOs are helping to overcome as well as the different roles that NGOs
now play in priority setting and the enforcement of international norms.
It concludes with the suggestion that as NGOs acquire more political
power, we need to develop minimal standards to assess NGO
performance.
Protection of the global environment from continuing degradation is
the most difficult problem facing the international community.1 The
most distinctive aspect of global environmental protection is that it is
primarily scientifically driven. International environmental standards
have been greatly influenced by priorities established by cosmopolitan
scientific elites and to a lesser extent by advocates of global social equity. 2
For this reason, calls for increased levels of global environmental protec-
tion challenge both the ways in which individual countries use natural
resources and the distribution of resource use between north and south.
These pleas thus challenge the basic assumptions of domestic legal sys-
tems as well as those of classic international law and the post-World War
II structure of international organizations.
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology; A.B. 1962, L.L.B. 1965, Stanford University.
I would like to thank Ms. Susan Hahn-Reizner, J.D. Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1992, for
her research skills in locating a great deal of valuable information about the activities of non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs).
1. See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD RESOURCES 1990-91 (1990), for an excellent
narrative and quantitative survey of global environmental degradation. Vice President Albert Gore
develops this theme in THE EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1992).
2. Equity has become a much more pervasive theme in the global environmental debate.
WORLD RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 1, observes that "[t]he world's environmental dilemma is that
the scale on which natural resources are being consumed and wastes are being produced is already
immense, yet many poor countries still lack and desperately need the benefits of industrialization and
economic development."
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The developing set of environmental principles adopted in a host of
international fora, most recently in Rio de Janeiro, set resource use pri-
orities that have the potential to intrude deeply on the traditional auton-
omy of the nation-state. This makes it difficult for international law to
accommodate environmental protection because the preservation of na-
tion-state autonomy has been the principal objective of modern interna-
tional law. Environmentalists, in contrast, view this objective as
subordinate to the prevention of global degradation. Environmental
norms are initially established to address problems that are defined with-
out regard to national boundaries. These norms initially address physical
not political problems. For problems such as global warming, a ton of
soft coal burned in China is the same as a ton burned in England.
Science alone, of course, cannot control the definition and responses
to environmental problems. Because they are fundamentally resource al-
location and distribution conflicts, they are political problems. Nations
will therefore address them in the context of their own self-interest.
Thus, these problems must be addressed within the context of national
and international legal systems and politics. However, science-driven
legal and political problems are different from other problems for two
reasons. First, the experience with global environmental standards shows
that individual nations have less of an ability to control the global agenda
by blocking efforts to establish high environmental standards. Second,
nations also have less control over the range of acceptable internal re-
sponses. The ability of political systems to respond by non-action is con-
strained. If the science is right, then the political response must be
adequate to address the problem as scientifically defined; half a loaf is the
same as no loaf.
The international community's response to ozone depletion illus-
trates these differences at work. The 1987 Montreal Protocol is a science-
driven international agreement that subordinates self-interest to science.
Disturbing scientific research led the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gram to make ozone depletion a priority and broke down national resist-
ance, in both the developed and developing world, to banning a wide
range of chloroflurocarbons (CFCs). This is the first international agree-
ment to take preventative action to minimize a risk, rather than to re-
spond to an existing condition of global resource degradation. Since
1987, the international community has moved to ban the offending chem-
icals at an accelerating rate.3 The politics of ozone protection were in-
3. RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE
PLANET 105 (1991).
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tense and complex and all countries took "unscientific" self-interest
positions at various times, but in the end both industrialized and develop-
ing countries, aided by a unique technology-transfer process, participated
in strengthening the Montreal Protocol. The former United States Am-
bassador, who represented the United States at the Montreal Protocol
Negotiations, observed that the "new wave of ecological consciousness"
meant that "failing to accept a share of responsibility and opting actively
to threaten the ozone layer would not be an easy course for a government
to follow."'4
The expanding role of science in defining environmental problems is
changing the politics of environmental priority setting and enforcement
by increasing the influence of NGOs.5 NGOs helped to spur action to
accelerate the phase-out of CFCs and play an increasingly powerful role
in setting the global environmental agenda. For example, the ratio of
NGO participants to United Nations and government officials at the
June 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment in Rio de Janeiro was approximately one to one. NGOs are now
permanent players in the international arena as they are in the United
States. Ironically, their domestic role was originally conceived of as a
temporary antidote to correct the failure of scientific management to en-
compass environmental values. Domestic NGO activism was a way to
"jump start" government agencies which were unresponsive to environ-
mental values because they had degenerated from progressive regulatory
agencies to ossified mission agencies. Once these agencies broadened
their values, it was hoped that they would once again merit the trust of
the public to manage resources scientifically. The opposite happened.
NGOs became permanent players in the regulatory game with the capac-
ity to influence all phases of policy, and NGO participation in law mak-
ing has now become a political theory. The existence of strong NGOs has
been identified as a hallmark of democratic government and thus a neces-
sary condition for effective environmentalism. 6
4. Id. at 152.
5. After this article was written, David Tolbert, Lecturer in Law at the University of Hull,
England, published part of his L.L.M. dissertation on NGOs as Global Climate Change and the Role
of International Non-Governmental Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLI-
MATE CHANGE 95 (Robin Churchill & David Freestone eds., 1991). Much of his extensive research
and analysis tracks my argument, although we differ modestly in the need to subject NGOs to mini-
mal standards of conduct.
6. Ibrahim J. Wani, Poverty, Governance, the Role of Law, and International Environmental-




II. THE PARADOX OF NGOs: POWER WITHOUT LEGAL STATUS
NGOs lack legal personality in classic international law and in the
theory of international organizations, but their lack of formal status has
not hindered their growing influence in foreign countries and interna-
tional organizations. NGOs thrived in the United States and in Europe7
because they had a legal status which served as the basis of a broader
political role. In contrast, international NGOs lack an international legal
personality, but they have been able to build on the legitimacy of domes-
tic NGOs to project themselves into the international arena.
NGO participation in the establishment and enforcement of global
environmental priorities is modeled after the experience with citizen
standing and intervention in the United States. Domestic and interna-
tional NGOs seek to exercise the same kind of legal and political influ-
ence, but the legal position of NGOs in the international community is
different. In the United States, NGOs have a tenuous constitutional sta-
tus and thus are subject to the discipline of the legal as well as the polit-
ical process. International and many foreign NGOs generally lack any
legal status and sometimes operate on the margins of established political
processes. This extra-legal character of NGOs has both positive and neg-
ative consequences: NGOs are at the mercy of international organization
and foreign domestic rules on access and participation; however, their
lack of legal status allows them to define their role unconstrained by the
law. This allows them to develop more creative and effective approaches
to environmental protection than those offered through litigation, espe-
cially before international tribunals.
NGO success and involvement in both international organizations
and individual nations has generally been hailed as a positive develop-
ment because they fill such a large void in both domestic and interna-
tional environmental competencies. This is a powerful justification for
their role. Adequate responses to environmental problems require large
allocations of scarce resources. NGOs help allocate scarce resources to
environmental issues in advance of the nation-centered international
community. They police international organizations and provide valua-
ble information and other assistance to developing nations. To date,
NGOs have been a positive force in bringing environmental issues onto
domestic and international political agendas since so much in current
7. The role of private individuals in the enforcement of European Community environmental
law is discussed in Frederick M. Abbott, Regional Integration and the Environment: The Evolution of
Legal Regimes, 68 CHI. KENT L. REv. 173 (1992).
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economic and political organizations is hostile to effective environmental-
ism. There is, however, a need for a more critical assessment of their role.
My thesis is that NGOs have progressed from influencing the articu-
lation of environmental aspirational standards of conduct, to the formu-
lation and implementation of policies both in international organizations
and individual nation-states, through moral and scientific persuasion, to
the exercise of power. NGOs now have the capacity to influence multi-
national organization policy and to intervene directly in choices tradi-
tionally reserved to individual sovereign states under international law.
They cannot alone overcome the difficulty of international law to adapt
to the imperatives of protection, but they exercise real power in the inter-
national community. In the main, the growth of NGOs has been a posi-
tive factor in the development of international environmental protection
regimes, but there is reason for caution. Because they exercise real polit-
ical power, the role of NGOs must be assessed critically, and ultimately
they must be held to some standards of performance.
III. NGOs FIND A NICHE
International environmental priorities are an interesting example of
the influence of intense preference groups in the establishment of envi-
ronmental priorities transcending the inability of formal governmental
institutions to respond to scientific information. These groups have great
success in shaping the environmental agenda of individual states, conven-
tion and treaty processes, and the work of the United Nations. Environ-
mental NGOs can be traced back to the formation of the International
Union for the Conservation of Nature in 1948, but the first United Na-
tions conference on the environment gave their current status. Since the
1972 Stockholm conference, NGOs have played an increasingly impor-
tant role in the development of global environmental standards and insti-
tutions as well as in the implementation of policies in individual
countries. NGO success can be attributed to advantages that they possess
over action by nation states. First, in the formulation of standards of
performance, they can articulate powerful universal, single-purpose stan-
dards. They need not trade-off environmental to other objectives because
they are not bound by the need of political leaders, elected and non-
elected, to avoid offending powerful constituencies. Second, for the same
reason, there is little incentive to subordinate science to other considera-
tions. Third, NGOs can often work with local environmental groups,
who lack both resources and political legitimacy, to support environmen-
tal initiatives. Greenpeace's work with local NGOs in Central America
19921
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to monitor attempts to import toxic wastes into the region is an example
of this role.8
NGOs fill a niche in international law created by the state-centered
notion of international law. The replacement of the relatively decentral-
ized power centers that were called states in the Middle Ages by power-
ful sovereign states during the Renaissance was one of the defining
moments in western history. Classic international law, which crystallized
in the nineteenth century, reflects this moment and has remained frozen
in it. The two World Wars have produced the United Nations and a
number of international organizations which play an increasingly power-
ful role,9 but respect for state sovereignty remains at the center of inter-
national law. 10 The international legal system remains bound by the
principles of absolute nation-state sovereignty except for vague and virtu-
ally unenforceable limitations when a state causes transnational harm."
NGOs do not accept international law and the international com-
munity as they find it. Environmental advocates reject the primacy of
exclusive national sovereignty. Sovereignty is often seen as a barrier to
the formulation and implementation of effective environmental policies.
The current expectation is that national self-interest will be reflected in
standards that represent and processes that reflect the lowest common
denominator standard. Reliance on traditional international cooperation
processes creates a highly centralized international environmental pro-
tection process which ensures that nations will almost inevitably reach
consensus on only the lowest common denominator standards and thus
will "underinvest" in environmental protection. Since Grotius' De Jure
Belli ac Pacis, international law has been concerned with the establish-
ment of the ground rules of "civilized" conflict among nations.1 2 Only
general or lowest common denominator standards are accepted as law.
The eighteenth and nineteenth century triumph of John Locke's idea of
constitutional governments with limited power changed the theory of in-
ternational law by making consensus the only criterion of legitimacy.
8. Greenpeace Claims Foreign Companies Dumping Waste in Seven Latin Nations, 15 Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 16 (Jan. 15, 1992).
9. See generally PAUL F. DIEHL, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PAT-
TERNS AND INSIGHTS (1989).
10. PHILLIP TAYLOR, NONSTATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: FROM TRANSRE-
GIONAL TO SUBSTATE ORGANIZATIONS 3 (1984).
11. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-70 (4th ed.
1990).
12. J. C. RANDALL, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIND: A SURVEY OF THE INTELLEC-
TUAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT AGE 197-201 (1926) remains a masterful examination of the
intellectual origins of modem international law.
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Constitutional governments thus robbed the most powerful nations of
their power to transcend international relations.
From the sweep of world history, the aspiration for "civilized" con-
flict among nations is a grand one. However, from an environmental per-
spective, the ideal of achieving a slightly less worse human condition
must be rejected as inadequate. If the warnings of scientists on issues
such as global warming, ozone depletion, and rain forest destruction are
correct, we can only aspire to higher not minimal standards of national
performance. Thus, global environmental protection poses an even more
difficult challenge to the international legal system than the effort to limit
war. International environmental law seeks ways to bring all nations up
to high standards of environmental protection consistent with notions of
inter-generational and inter-regional equity. This aspiration is reflected in
the current efforts to promote sustainable development in both the devel-
oped and developing world.
The direct doctrinal underpinning for the recognition of NGOs in
international law, is the theory of the "private attorney general" as ar-
ticulated by Judge Jerome Frank, 13 although ironically the Supreme
Court is moving away from the private attorney general theory in the
direction of the "statist" theory of classic international law. 14 No such
concept can exist in international law because only states have standing
to sue before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 5 However, the
wide spread de jure and de facto democratization of the judicial process
and the increasingly prominent role of multi-national organizations has
made it possible to analogize from domestic to international law. The
Grotian idea that individuals as states are part of international society,
rejected in the nineteenth century, also supports the recognition of inter-
national legal status for NGOs.' 6
NGOs' arguments for a formal legal status ultimately build on two
post-World War II attacks on the premise of classic international law
that co-existence is the objective of the international legal system as well
13. The leading case is Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). See
generally Roger C. Cramton & Barry B. Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or
Promise, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 407 (1972); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public
Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432 (1988). For an application of this model to international NGOs, see
David A. Wirth, Legitmacy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Model for Advocacy on Third World
Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645 (1991).
14. See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
15. See Phillipe J. Sand, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 393, 397 (1989).
16. Hedley Bull, The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, in HuGO
GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 65, 83-87 (Hedley Bull et al. eds.,1990).
1992)
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as on the Grotian idea of an international society. The first post-World
War II development is the McDougall "deconstruction" of international
law. McDougall and his school accepted co-existence among the major
power blocks as the objective of international law, but applied American
realist jurisprudence to include both de jure and de facto actors. The
second is the argument of the late Wolfgang Friedman that as interna-
tional law progressed from co-existence to cooperation, the category of
entities with an international legal personality expanded.1 7 From this
perspective, NGOs can be seen as an extension of the growing status of
international organizations.1 8 As a leading treatise observes, "There is
no general rule that the individual cannot be a 'subject of international
law'. . .
While American theories of citizen standing provide the primary
legal rationale for NGO legitimacy, the ability to capitalize on this posi-
tion derives from the science-driven nature of environmental politics.
Most environmental problems have secured a place on political and pol-
icy agendas only because members of an educated elite believe what
scientists warn. Environmental agendas are formulated at the top and
then supported by the most educated segments of an electorate. They
seldom come from the bottom up, although in the former Soviet Union
and Eastern European block countries environmentalism was one of the
only means of general protest against communist control.20 For exam-
ple, ozone depletion is a problem because scientists predict that contin-
ued ozone depletion will cause serious health risks and contribute to
global warming. Scientists, however, only influence, they do not control
the policy agenda. The environmental protection agenda is set by polit-
ical institutions which respond to specific constituencies with perceptions
of the problem that are science-based but not limited by the canons of
scientific evidence.
There is a growing literature on the factors which influence the rise
and fall of issues on political agendas, and this literature explains the
influence of NGOs. The basic conclusion of this research is familiar to
the parents of teenage children: both legislators and teenagers have short
attention spans and respond primarily to noise. Increasingly, noise is a
function of information not just numbers. Environmental issues are char-
17. WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964).
18. At the present time, however, international law only recognizes organizations that are a
permanent association of nation states and exercise similar powers. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at
680-83.
19. Id. at 67.
20. See MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE USSR (1992).
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acterized as political problems when there is a perceived crisis. Histori-
cally, the crisis has been a specific disaster, such as an oil spill, but,
contrary to public choice and interest group political theory,2' knowl-
edgeable interest groups can serve as "information brokers" and "exer-
cise important influence in the legislative process."'2
2
IV. NGOs: NEW VOICES, NEW ACTORS
NGOs perform at least four related functions. They bring neglected
as well as transcendent perspectives to bear in different fora, they moni-
tor the environmental impacts of various activities, and they participate
directly in resource allocation. 23 In short, they increasingly perform roles
traditionally assigned to state agencies.
A. Infusion of Alternative Perspectives into Narrow Mission Programs
The case for NGOs rests on the premise that non-governmental en-
tities have a positive role to play in contributing new information and
perspectives to policy formulation. This role is a major extension of their
traditional role as information synthesizers. NGOs have deep roots in the
international community; they reflect a long tradition of international
scientific meetings and semi-official international organizations, but their
role has evolved to one of claimed parity with established governmental
institutions. The modern NGO as a direct political actor with non-state
interests in the international affairs emerged at the 1972 United Nations
Conference on the Environment in Sweden. NGOs did not have a sub-
stantial direct influence on the conference24 but they gained a legitimacy
that they lacked before Stockholm.
The Stockholm Conference is generally counted as one of the most
successful environmental conferences. It projected environmental con-
cern into international politics where it remains an expanding priority. It
also articulated a set of principles that remain the starting point for dis-
cussions of international law and treaty standards and it institutionalized
21. See RICHARD J. TOBIN, THE EXPENDABLE FUTURE: U.S. POLITICS AND THE PROTEC-
TION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 15-26 (1990), which used agenda theory to explain why endan-
gered species protection is a very small dot on the congressional radar screen.
22. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J. LAW, ECON. &
ORG. 59, 72 (1992).
23. Tolbert, supra note 5, at 98-106, identifies four NGO functions beyond traditional scientific
advisory functions: (1) the identification of environmental issues and general principles of interna-
tional environmental law, (2) ombudsmen or guardian activities, (3) creation of international stan-
dards and norms, and (4) enforcement of international standards.
24. LYNTON K. CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EMERGENCE AND
DIMENSIONS 58 (2d ed. 1990).
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this concern within the United Nations through the U.N. Environmental
Program. Much of the success of the conference was the result of careful
preparation and masterful diplomacy by conference secretary general
Maurice Strong. However, the presence and participation by NGOs cre-
ated a precedent that remains.
NGOs now seek political parity to counter the narrow self-interest
politics of nation states, If politics is all interest groups, then all interest
groups should have access to decision making processes. In the United
States the opening of both administrative and judicial processes to inter-
est group plaintiffs was justified because it furthered interest group liber-
alism. Environmental advocates in both Europe and the developing
world have admired and emulated this model. As a Ugandan emigree
teaching in the United States recently put it, "[e]ffective environmental-
ism is virtually impossible without basic democratic conditions. ' 25
The international law argument for NGOs' status is also a major
extension of the argument for citizen or public interest standing in the
United States. United States law draws a sharp distinction between adju-
dication and political action which will not hold in the international con-
text. In the United States, the case against the citizen suit is that it
politicizes the judiciary. This is a false concern since courts are limited to
cases and controversies under Article III. To cabin citizen standing,
United States courts grant "injured" public interest plaintiffs standing
only to enforce existing statutory mandates ignored by the agency. Citi-
zen standing is justified by notions of pluralism that define legitimate de-
cisions as those based on all legitimate view points. The idea of judicial
participation in the establishment and enforcement of environmental pri-
orities appeals to environmentalists in strong central administrative
states as well, and this argument has become the basis for the integration
of NGOs into the international community.
The analogy between domestic citizen standing and NGO participa-
tion in international law-making is apt, but concerns about the NGO role
are more justified because there are no institutional constraints on NGO
roles. This is a matter of considerable concern because in many interna-
tional agencies the split between politics and technical expertise is a mat-
ter of great concern, and it is harder to maintain the line between the
two. International organizations often provide an effective forum for de-
veloping countries to vent their frustrations, and NGOs can veer from
articulating scientific positions that try to bring disparate interests to-
gether to articulating polarizing positions. NGO actions reflect the full
25. Wani, supra note 6, at 41.
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range of contributions and have generally been hailed as positive. How-
ever, NGOs are not bound by the limitations of domestic law because
their international legal status is different. At the present time NGOs
participate at the discretion of the international organizations of the
states. Some organizations have procedures to accredit NGOs.
NGO access is often more difficult, but once access is obtained,
NGOs are free to use their influence to define agendas as they choose.
Under the United States model, citizen, suits are open to all who have
standing and the law of standing does not screen directly for citizen com-
petence. The idea of a case limits what the NGOs can do in a law suit.
No similar limitation exists at the international level. The limitations,
such as they are, are solely on access to a process. International organiza-
tions have adopted Professor Jaffe's suggestion that courts screen citizen
plaintiffs. This allows agencies to limit participation to those most likely
to advance the work of the agency but this procedure is biased in favor of
well-financed groups.
Putting fresh alternative approaches on the table has been the bread
and butter activity of NGOs. Most governments still pursue short-term
economic development with little serious consideration of alternatives
such as sustainable development. For example, a group of Spanish NGOs
issued a report which not only criticized the Madrid-Seville high-speed
train, but offered a detailed blueprint for sustainable rural development.
The report recommends that rural areas participate in the coastal and
urban boom in Spain by being allowed to market their natural value and
products to urban dwellers under carefully controlled conditions.26
One of the major success stories of NGOs has been the role that they
have played in the transformation of the World Bank's mission, which is
under continuing criticism for its support of projects with large adverse
environmental and social consequences. NGOs lobbied the Bank directly
as well as the United States Congress, and in the past few years Congress
has enacted legislation requiring that U.S. agencies urge the Bank to
adopt environmentally responsive lending policies. 27 Since 1986, the
Bank has taken impressive steps to make sustainable development the
operating standard for future loans. My colleague Bartram Brown has
evaluated efforts to politicize the technical mission international organi-
zations. He distinguishes between political activity which is unrelated to
the mandate of the agency and impairs its ability to carry out its mission
26. Development Plans Being Pursued at Expense of Environment, Groups Claim, 15 Int'l Envtl.
Rep. (BNA) 18 (Jan. 15, 1992).
27. 22 U.S.C.S. § 2621-m (Law. Co-op. 1992).
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and that which enhances mandates. NGO pressure, aided by United
States legislation, is an example of beneficial political pressure because
"the Bank's ability to function and to fulfill its mandate has been en-
hanced by these reforms. It is true, of course, that the Bank's Charter
never specifically mentions protecting the environment ... nonetheless,
this objective is very much consistent"' 28 with its mandate to improve the
world standard of living through useful projects.
B. The Articulation of Universal Perspectives
NOOs play a role which is both similar and more powerful than
public interest plaintiffs in domestic law. In domestic law, public interest
adds a perspective to that of the agency by presenting the court with an
ignored statutory or constitutional value. This is a familiar role for
NGOs and commentators have urged that international agencies allow
wide-spread NGO participation. In the international arena, NGOs often
play a more transcendent role. They offer a fundamentally different per-
spective from ones urged by nation states. One of the major criticisms of
international environmental law making29 is that it is overly constrained
by the state sovereignty which allows states to put state interest first in
international negotiations. When agreement is reached, it reflects the
lowest common denominator. NGOs, in contrast, are not bound by state
interest but can articulate and advocate a global perspective. This can be
a modest role such as the presentation of neutral scientific information to
break a deadlock over the science of an issue or the articulation of the
heretical idea that there should be no compromise on environmental
issues.
The flip side of transcendence is, of course, ideological intransigence
which can conflict with the underlying science as well as with legitimate
non-environmental concerns. The positions taken by international wild-
life organizations at the 1992 Kyoto Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species (CITES) illustrate the problem of NGO inflexi-
bility. Several southeast African nations wanted to relax the CITES ban
on trade in elephant hides and tusks. Relaxation was successfully op-
posed by many wildlife conservation NGOs, supported by thirty United
States Senators, who saw the problem as a standard anti-species conser-
vation move. However, the issue is more complicated. The nations, the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and other NGOs saw the issue
28. See BARTRAM BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD
BANK: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 238 (1992).
29. Developments in the Law: International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1484, 1490
(1991).
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as a sustainable development problem and were willing to entertain the
counter-environmentally intuitive proposal that limited trade in Elephant
products was not inconsistent with species conservation. 30 There is no
requirement that politics produce rational or right decisions, but the abil-
ity of NGOs to block creative science-based solutions is troublesome.
C. Direct Participation in Enforcement
NGOs are playing an increasing role in the enforcement of interna-
tional environmental standards. There is no basis for this role in interna-
tional law but nonetheless NGOs have carved out a role. Under United
States law and the laws of a few European countries, citizen organiza-
tions have a statutory enforcement role through the ability to bring citi-
zen suits. There is no corresponding role in international law both
because of the principle that only states have standing and the law of
effective judicial and administrative enforcement mechanisms. Paradoxi-
cally, the non-role of the International Court of Justice and the limited
enforcement powers of the United Nations Environmental Program have
given NGOs the flexibility to play more diverse and creative roles.
NGO participation in the area of environmental norms is the easiest
to justify, especially in developing countries which lack an effective regu-
latory infra-structure. NGOs are free to do what international law pros-
cribes-to intervene in a nation's affairs which would fall under that
nation's exclusive sovereignty under classic international law. NGOs are
not bound by the non-intervention principles of international law. They
are free to lobby international organizations as well as to use their influ-
ence to shape domestic political agendas. For example, recently a coali-
tion of local and international environmental groups played a significant
role in persuading the government of Honduras to reject a United States
corporation's proposal to construct a large pulp and paper mill because
the-project threatened to destroy a tropical forest.31
D. Direct Participation in Resource Allocation
NGOs have played their most creative role in pioneering incentives
for developing nations to adopt environmental practices. Inter-genera-
tional equity requires that environmental protection be integrated with
economic development. The north-south split is the most difficult un-
30. Stephen R. Weisman, Bluefin Tuna and African Elephants Win Some Help at a Global
Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1992, at AS.
31. Ecological Concerns Prompt Government to Reject Proposals from West, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) 192-93 (Apr. 8, 1992).
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resolved environmental issue and the resolution of this issue increasingly
drives global environmental issues. The issue has been framed as a classic
redistribution issue: the north took resources from the south through
colonialism and transformed them through technology and must now
make restitution. The actors have been states and state-controlled multi-
national organizations such as the World Bank. Since World War II,
there has been limited technology transfer in the form of foreign assist-
ance. After the OPEC oil embargo and consequent rise in the price of oil,
money flowed into private and public banks and was recycled to develop-
ing countries in the form of loans. These loans are now a crushing debt
burden for many countries and puts intense pressures on countries to
continue to exploit rapidly their natural resources bases. This burden has
also provided a small but growing window of opportunity for NGOs to
change internal resource use priorities.
In 1984, Thomas Lovejoy proposed a new form of private debt re-
lief: debt-for-nature swaps. In brief, NGOs purchase from a bank a por-
tion of the debt of developing countries faced with a write-off or write-
down prospect. Developing country "paper" is plentiful and relatively
cheap. The NGO must fund a debt instrument with hard currency that
the developing country would like to retire as quickly as possible, often
high interest, short term bonds. After the NGO purchases the instru-
ment, it is converted into the local currency of the debtor country and
the debt service is applied to purchase land threatened by development or
to finance a conservation program. Debtor countries gain the benefit of
servicing its debt with local rather than hard currency, subject to NGO
control over the country's natural resources. Banks may deduct the origi-
nal amount of the debt donated rather than the current fair market value
of the debt.3 2 This strategy has been adopted by the United States gov-
ernment because it makes the best of a bad situation, helping developing
nations with crushing debt burdens, and offers a modest way to support
sustainable development projects.
In 1987, Conservation International purchased $650,000 of Bolivian
debt for Citicorp at an 85% discount and cancelled the debt in return for
Bolivia's promise to protect 3.7 million acres of rain forest surrounding
the Beni Biosphere reserve. The World Wildlife Fund used the proceeds
of its swap to fund an Ecuadorian NGO. A Mexican environmental
group, Pronatura, negotiated a $3,000,000 swap with its government in
1991.
Debt-for-nature swaps are unlikely to be a major vehicle for devel-
32. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205.
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oping country debt relief but they have considerable potential to save
high priority natural areas such as rain forests. From a legal point of
view the most interesting aspect of debt-for-nature swaps is the creative
NGO circumvention of the basic principle of international law, pro-
claimed by the United Nations at the height of the Cold War,33 that each
nation has the right to exploit its natural resources. Debt-for-Nature-
Swaps have been criticized as a new form of economic imperialism, 34 but
the device is preferable to traditional economic development which was
dictated by the donor country and the World Bank. There are, however,
many difficult issues to be faced in the future. For example, the tradi-
tional model of resource preservation, the protected enclave such as a
national park, has limited application to the rain forests and other pro-
ductive but environmentally sensitive areas of the developing world.
V. CONCLUSION
The late twentieth century is another defining moment in world his-
tory. The international community is both fragmenting into the worst
excesses of nineteenth century nationalism and coming together around a
series of basic norms. Science and technology limit state monopolies on
power, and it will be increasingly difficult for states to maintain resource
use policies which deviate from international environmental norms.
NGOs have a major and positive role to play in this process. At the pres-
ent time, their activity needs only to be encouraged and monitored.
However, as they acquire more real power, they must be brought into
established legal systems so that they can be subjected to standards of
accountability. NGOs should not be held to the standards of national
states or international organizations, but minimum norms of responsible
environmental participation should be developed to monitor their
performance. 35
Because information is the source of NGO power, their use of infor-
mation should be the measure of their activities. NGOs have a responsi-
bility to use the best available information to advance the norms of
environmentalism such as biodiversity protection, sustainable develop-
ment and a decent level of freedom from exposure to harmful substances.
They are not limited to "good science" since environmentalism is at base
33. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, UN GAOR 17th Sess.,
Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
34. See Michael Chamberlain et al., Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 415-41.
35. But cf Tolbert, supra note 5. Mr. Tolbert argues that because NGOs possess limited formal
powers "any attempt to regulate NGOs, without a substantial increase in their rights and powers,
appears to be unjustified." Id. at 95, n.2.
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an ethical theory of science, but NGO activities must adhere to some
higher standard than simply "interest" if they are to maintain their
legitimacy.
